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STRONG EMERGENCE 
Alexander D. Carruth and J.T.M. Miller 
ABSTRACT 
A crucial question for both philosophy and for science concerns the kind of 
relationship that obtains between entities—objects, properties, states, 
processes, kinds and so on—that exist at apparently higher and lower ‘levels’ of 
reality. According to reductionism, seeming higher-level entities can in fact be 
fully accounted for by more fundamental, lower-level entities. Conversely, 
emergentists of various stripes hold that whilst higher-level entities depend in 
some important sense on lower-level entities, they are nevertheless irreducible 
to them. This introductory paper outlines the context of the debate between 
emergentists and reductionists; offers a broad characterisation of ‘strong’ or 
ontological emergence, and provides summaries of each of the papers to come 
in this special issue. 
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1. The structure of inquiry and the 
structure of the world 
Part of the job of scientific inquiry is to engage with, make sense of, 
describe, explain and make predictions concerning the wildly varied 
phenomena which constitute the world around us. As a consequence of 
this aforementioned variety, distinct disciplines each with their own 
intellectual regimes—domains of inquiry, basic assumptions, 
investigative techniques and so on—address different groupings of this 
phenomena. Thus, physics, or at least an important part of that 
discipline, is concerned with the properties of and interactions between 
the relatively small and simple constituents of matter, and of energy. 
Chemistry addresses more complexly structured systems of those 
constituents that form substances—in the standard, as opposed to 
technical metaphysical, sense: elements, compounds, mixtures, 
suspensions and so on. Biology treats phenomena which exhibit the 
characteristics which are criterial for life, ranging over micro-organisms, 
flora, fauna etc. Psychology and cognitive science engage with just those 
living things which possess mentality, and sociology, economics and 
political science all range over aspects of the interactions between these 
thinking agents. These characterisations are somewhat glib, and they 
surely fall short of a properly nuanced and comprehensive conception of 
each discipline, but hopefully they are fit for the illustrative purpose to 
which they are employed. 
That inquiry has this sort of structure raises a number of interesting 
philosophical questions. One such set of questions concerns the sorts of 
relationships that obtain between the theories put forward by each 
discipline. Another set of questions concerns the extent to which the sort 
of structure described above is a feature not just of the way we organise 
our inquiry into the world, but of the world itself: that is, addressing the 
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sorts of relationships that obtain between the phenomena with which 
the various sciences are concerned. This special issue is primarily 
focussed on questions of the latter sort: the papers collected here 
examine the ontological debate between emergentists and reductionists. 
‘Strong’ or ontological emergenistism could be roughly characterised as 
the view that the sort of structure exhibited by inquiry is mirrored in the 
world itself: there are genuinely distinct, hierarchically arranged ‘levels 
of reality’, with entities or phenomena at higher levels existing 
separately from those at lower levels, but still somehow dependent on 
those lower-level entities and phenomena. The most common converse 
view, wholesale ontological reductionism, holds that this structure is 
merely apparent, and is not mirrored in reality: all genuine existence is 
confined to a single, fundamental level, and apparently higher-level 
entities can be identified with or reduced to or otherwise accounted for 
by the fundamental entities. 
2. Introducing ‘strong’ emergence 
So far, it has been said that strong emergentism involves a denial of 
reductionism. However, strong emergentism involves more than just 
this. For one thing, there are positions other than emergentism which 
also deny reductionism—for instance, one might hold a sort of 
ontological pluralism that involves the denial of reductionism, but which 
also denies the sort of levelled structure of dependencies which the 
emergentist takes to obtain between different domains of phenomena. 
Some further commitments which are characteristic of strong 
emergentism include, but probably aren’t limited to: 
 
Distinctness: the emergent entity must be something different from the 
‘base’ entities from which it emerges.  
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Novelty: the emergent entity must be novel with respect to its base; 
although it needn’t be novel in some absolute sense, that is, it needn’t be 
the first individual entity of its kind to exist. This novelty must be more 
than additive/aggregative novelty: the mass of a one kilogram sample of 
sugar is distinct from the masses of each of the granules which constitute 
it, but it is easy to see how the mass of the whole sample is merely an 
aggregate of the masses of its members. The combination of novelty with 
distinctness perhaps captures the sense of the locution ‘over and above’, 
which is often used to describe the relation emergent entities bear to the 
base entities from which they emerge. 
 
Dependence: there is some relationship of dependence between the 
emergent entities and the base entities from which they emerge. This 
dependence should be asymmetric: it shouldn’t also be the case that the 
basic entities depend on the emergent entities. It should also be 
existential in nature: the emergent entities would not exist without the 
base entities. 
3. Emergence: weak and strong 
Strong emergence is typically taken to be ontological in nature. However, 
alternative notions of emergence have been proposed that are more 
epistemological. Weak emergence, as described by Chalmers (2006), only 
holds that the truths concerning high-level phenomenon are unexpected 
given the principles at the lower domain. Cases of strong emergence as 
outlined above will therefore be instances of weak emergence in 
Chalmers’ sense, but not necessarily vice versa. Similarly, we can 
understand the reduction relation as holding between objects, events, or 
properties, or as holding between theories, concepts, or models. The 
former can be taken to be ontological reduction; the latter 
representational reduction (Van Gulick 2001). 
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The philosophical literature on emergence has, broadly, been 
concerned mostly with strong or ontological emergence. But 
epistemological emergence has been more influential and popular within 
the scientific community, with many persuaded to adopt weak 
emergentism on the back of the seeming impossibility of inter-theoretic 
reduction. Such weakly emergent phenomenon would have some, but 
not all, of the characteristics of strongly emergent phenomenon.  Some 
form of dependence, novelty, and distinctness would still apply; 
however, there would be no influence of the higher-level on the lower. 
That is, no claim of downwards causation wherein a higher-level entity is 
in some way causally powerful at the lower-level. To be clear, not all 
notions of strong emergence must accept this possibility either, but weak 
emergence, with its focus on theories and concepts rather than objects, 
events, or properties, must instead posit emergent phenomenon as being 
(a possibly unavoidable) part of our descriptions of reality rather than 
part of reality itself. 
This special issue aims to clarify a range of issues concerning what the 
claim that there are strongly emergent phenomena commits us to, and 
to investigate the plausibility of certain candidate examples of strong 
emergence. The papers therefore take up both theoretical and empirical 
questions around the possible existence of strong emergence. This 
intersecting of the theoretical and the empirical is especially important 
in the case of debates about emergence. This is because many of the 
supporters of emergence draw their belief in emergence from the 
apparent examples of emergent phenomena: that is, phenomena that, it 
is claimed, cannot be explained if we adopt alternative views about the 
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4. Overview of papers in volume 1 
In ‘Explanatory Emergence as a Guide to Metaphysical Structure’, Elanor 
Taylor argues that explanatory emergence might be used for 
metaphysical purposes. Under this view, emergence is relativized to 
factors such as an observer, a form of explanation, a standard for 
unavailability, and a distinction between component and whole. 
However, whilst emergence is explanatory, Taylor argues that it may be 
so for metaphysical reasons.  
Taylor admits that working out which cases of explanatory 
emergence are metaphysically relevant as opposed to being merely 
epistemic is difficult. However, Taylor points towards the recognition by 
many that certain kinds of explanation might be metaphysical in nature, 
and thus be metaphysically significant. Likewise for the idea of a 
metaphysically significant observer rather than a scientific observer. 
Taylor argues that at least some scientific observers will be 
metaphysically significant even though the two will not exactly coincide. 
These considerations are grounds for thinking that the idea that 
explanatory emergence is metaphysically significant is not as unusual as 
we might think. Taylor closes with two case studies, from the 19th century 
debate between mechanists and vitalists and the contemporary debate 
about the explanatory gap in philosophy of mind, which show that in fact 
we already do take explanatory emergence as a guide to metaphysical 
structure. 
In ‘Must Strong Emergence Collapse?’, Jessica Wilson and Umut 
Baysan focus on a set of objections that have been proposed against the 
coherency of strong emergence that can together be classed as ‘collapse 
objections’. This is done with particular respect to a powers-based 
account of emergence. Wilson and Baysan develop four new strategies 
that the powers-based account can respond to the collapse problem: an 
appeal to a distinction between direct and indirect having of powers, an 
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appeal to a distinction between lightweight and heavyweight 
dispositions, a view on which strong emergence is relativized to sets of 
fundamental interactions, and a view on which strongly emergent 
powers are had by new objects. Wilson and Baysan also argue that these 
four responses can be independently motivated. 
As with other papers in this special issue, Wilson and Baysan admit 
that these responses do not prove the existence of strongly emergent 
powers. However, they argue that it does show that a powers-based 
strong emergence can be made sense of, and that the view is at least a 
plausible candidate alternative to reductivist views. 
In ‘Language and Ontological Emergence’, James Miller outlines a case 
for a novel example of strong emergence to be found in linguistics. Miller 
argues that if some plausible and well-supported linguistic views are 
correct, most centrally claims within generative grammar about the role 
and scope of both the semantic and syntactic components of the human 
linguistic faculty, then a case can be made for strongly emergent 
properties at the sentential level. The example that is focused on here is 
the property of truth-evaluability, which Miller argues cannot be easily 
reduced to a lower-level property, or the interaction of lower-level 
properties. 
Miller’s claim is not that the argument in his paper proves that the 
property of truth-evaluability is strongly emergent. Rather, the claim is 
that emergence is as plausible a view as a reductionist one. If correct, this 
would show that the explanatory power of emergence stretches beyond 
more commonly cited and debated examples in physics and the 
philosophy of mind. At the least, this example would seem to pose a new 
challenge to the reductionist to show how such causally powerful but 
higher-level linguistic properties can indeed be reduced without 
introducing new posits that cannot be empirically supported by 
linguistic data. 
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In ‘Strong Emergence, No, Contextual Emergence, Yes’, Michael 
Silberstein outlines contextual emergence, as a position that is a robust 
alternative to ontological reductionism, but without the gaps in the unity 
of nature that might be implied by traditionally understood strong 
emergence. Contextual emergence is the view that new entities emerge 
out of multiscale contexts, which modally constrain the overall system. 
Nature is inherently contextual, allowing for the coming into existence 
of novel, irreducible entities (e.g. an entangled state), but without 
violating compositional and realization accounts of part/whole relations. 
This form of middle-ground emergence, for Silberstein, is not simply 
philosophically and empirically more supportable than the stronger and 
weaker forms, but that contextual emergence should be seen as the 
norm, not just an exception, when trying to explain new and stable 
phenomena.  
Furthermore, this is not an epistemic form of emergence; it is ontic. 
New entities come into existence with the more fundamental domain 
providing at best necessary but no sufficient conditions for emergence of 
the less fundamental phenomena. Silberstein goes on to argue that far 
from being a fringe view, ontic structural realism, monism and 
dispositionalism all involve some commitment to ontological contextual 
emergence. The world might look at times to be reductionist, and at 
others emergentist; but Silberstein proposes that this is ultimately due in 
fact to its contextual nature. 
In volume 2 of this special issue Mark Pexton addresses questions 
concerning manipulationism and causal exclusion; Peter Lewis discusses 
quantum mechanics, emergence and fundamentality; Jonathan Bain 
examines issues concerning topological ordering and emergence; Tom 
McLeish discusses downward causation and emergence in biological 
physics; and Steven Blundell addresses questions concerning condensed 
matter physics, emergence and the limitations of the human mind. 
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